

## ATHENIAN SEA-POWER IN 323/2 BC: DREAM AND REALITY

BOOKS xviii–xx of Diodorus' *Bibliotheca Historica* have long been regarded, apart from the sections on Sicily and Italy, as closely based on the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, a friend of several of the leading Macedonians, and as giving a reliable, if condensed, account of the events succeeding the death of Alexander.<sup>1</sup> What is said there about the obscure naval events of the crucial year 323/2 must then provide the framework into which any other information about those events is to be fitted.

(i) xviii 9.4: ἐπεὶ δὲ τινες ἐκ Βαβυλῶνος ἦκον αὐτόπται γεγονότες τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλλαγῆς, τότε φανερώς ὁ δῆμος ἀπεκαλύψατο πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

When the messengers came from Babylon who had been eye-witnesses of the king's death, the (Athenian) demos came out openly in favour of the war. . .

(ii) xviii 10.1–3: Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων < . . . > τῶν μὲν κτηματικῶν συμβουλευόντων τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τῶν δὲ δημοκόπων ἀνασειόντων τὰ πλήθη καὶ παρακαλούντων ἐρωμένως ἔχεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου, πολὺ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ὑπερεῖχον οἱ τὸν πόλεμον αἰρούμενοι καὶ τὰς τροφὰς εἰωθότες ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ μισθοφορεῖν. Εὐθύς οὖν οἱ μὲν ῥήτορες τὰς τῶν δημοτικῶν ὁρμὰς σωματοποιοῦντες ἔγραψαν ψήφισμα τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας φροντίσαι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὰς μὲν φρουρουμένας πόλεις ἐλευθερώσαι, ναῦς δὲ παρασκευάσαι τριήρεις μὲν τεσσαράκοντα, τετρήρεις δὲ διακοσίας, στρατεύσασθαι δὲ πάντας Ἀθηναίους τοὺς μέχρις ἑτῶν τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρεῖς μὲν φυλάς τὴν Ἀττικὴν παραφυλάττειν, τὰς δ' ἑπτὰ πρὸς τὰς ὑπερορίους στρατείας ἐτοίμους εἶναι. Ἐκπέμψαι δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις τοὺς ἐπελευσομένους τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ διδάξοντας ὅτι καὶ πρότερον μὲν ὁ δῆμος, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν κοινὴν εἶναι πατρίδα κρίνων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τοὺς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ στρατευσαμένους βαρβάρους ἡμύνατο κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ νῦν οἴεται δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας καὶ σώμασι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ ναυσὶ προκινδυνεύειν.

The Athenian demos . . .<sup>2</sup> While the propertied men were advising no action to be taken and the rabble rousers<sup>3</sup> were stirring up the people and calling on them to take up the war vigorously, those were far more numerous who chose war and were accustomed to make their living from service pay. . . Straightway then the rhetors gave expression to the popular intentions and drafted a decree to the following effect. The demos should take thought for the common freedom of the Greeks: they should on the one hand set about liberating the garrisoned cities, and on the other procure forty triereis and two hundred tetrereis,<sup>4</sup> call up all Athenians under the age of forty, three tribes to guard Attica and seven to be ready for foreign service; send out also envoys to go round the Greek cities and carry the message that as in former times the demos, regarding all Greece as the common fatherland of the Greeks, had repelled at sea the barbarians who had come to enslave them, so at the present time the demos recognised it as their duty to risk their lives and treasure and ships in the cause of the common freedom of Greece. [The emphasis on naval action is to be noted.]

(iii) The account then records the doubts of the wiser heads among the Greeks, but adds, xviii 10.5:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρέσβων ἐπιπορευομένων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τῇ συνῆθει τῶν λόγων δεινότητι παρορμώντων πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον αἱ πλεῖστα μὲν συνέθεντο τὴν συμμαχίαν, αἱ μὲν κατ' ἔθνος, αἱ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν.

Nevertheless, as the envoys went round the cities and roused them to war with their usual cleverness of speech,<sup>5</sup> most of the Greeks joined the alliance, some on a national basis, some city by city.

<sup>1</sup> See most recently Jane Hornblower *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford 1981) who speaks of the *Bibliotheca* as 'an extensive epitome of (or more precisely a series of extracts from) a Hellenistic historian'.

<sup>2</sup> *Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque Historique: Livre xviii* Texte établi et traduit par P. Goukowski (Paris 1978) (henceforward referred to as Goukowski). He says *ad. loc.*: 'L'anacolouthe laisse suspecter une lacune de

quelques lignes'. The anacolouthon is perhaps acceptable as it stands.

<sup>3</sup>The Greek word *δημόκοποι* is hardly respectful.

<sup>4</sup> For the text and translation of this article of the decree, see below II.

<sup>5</sup> The phrase 'usual cleverness of speech', like *δημόκοποι* above, seems by its tone to derive from Hieronymus.

(iv) When Antipater heard of the Greek revolt, xviii 12.2:

ἀνέρευξεν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας εἰς Θετταλίαν, συμπαραπλέοντος αὐτῷ τοῦ στόλου παντός, ὃν ἀπεσταλκῶς ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος παραπέμψοντα πλήθος χρημάτων ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν θησαυρῶν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν, οὐσῶν τῶν πασῶν τριήρων ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα.

He set out from Macedonia to Thessaly accompanied by the whole squadron which Alexander had sent to convoy a consignment of bullion from the king's treasury to Macedonia, being in all 110 triereis.<sup>6</sup>

(v) After describing the Greek successes<sup>7</sup> against Antipater on land, Diodorus gives a brief and dismissive summary of the Athenian defeats at sea in the summer of 323/2, on which the outcome of the Greek challenge to Macedon ultimately turned, xviii 15.8–9:

Καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν τοιαύταις εὐημερίαις ὑπῆρχε. Τῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων θαλασσοκρατούντων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶν ἄλλας κατεσκεύασαν, ὥστε γενέσθαι τὰς πάσας ἑκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα. Τῶν δὲ Μακεδονικῶν νεῶν οὐσῶν διακοσίων καὶ τεσσαράκοντα τὴν ναυαρχίαν εἶχε Κλεῖτος. Οὗτος δὲ ναυμαχήσας πρὸς Εὐετίωνα τὸν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχον ἐνίκησε δυσὶν ναυμαχίαις καὶ συχνάς τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν διέφθειρε περὶ τὰς καλουμένας Ἐχινάδας νήσους.

The fortunes of the Greeks were thus enjoying fair weather. Since the Macedonians had naval superiority, the Athenians fitted out other ships in addition to those they already had (at sea),<sup>8</sup> with the result that the total was 170. Cleitus was in command of the Macedonian fleet which was 240 in number. He engaged the Athenian commander Euetion and defeated him in two naval battles, and destroyed many of the enemy ships near the islands called Echinades.

## II. THE DECREE

At line 6 of (ii) above the word *παρασκευάσαι* has universally been taken to mean 'to prepare for immediate service'. The assembly has accordingly been represented as ordering the *launching* of 240 ships *already in the dockyard*.<sup>9</sup> This rendering leads to two difficulties. In the first place, with the text as it stands in the manuscripts, it seems impossible that Athens who had only 50 tetrereis in 325/4<sup>10</sup> should be in a position to contemplate launching 200 for service in the spring of 322.<sup>11</sup> Wesseling accordingly transposed tetrereis/triereis and has been followed by subsequent editors (Fischer 1906, Geer 1962, and Goukowski 1978), in spite of the fact recently pointed out by Ashton that the decree like the naval inventories was an official document and that in the latter triereis are regularly listed before tetrereis.

The second difficulty arises whether or not a transposition is accepted. If the Assembly took the decision to launch 240 ships, they must have believed that they were capable of providing in a few months, largely at any rate from their own resources, the ships, money, men and gear needed for this substantial force. It could hardly be expected that the proposed diplomatic offensive would produce results in time. Yet when the time came Athens could maintain her fleet at a strength of 170 ships (see (v) above and note 36 below). This outcome is the more

<sup>6</sup> Goukowski 124: 'Je croirais plutôt qu'il s'agit ici de navires et de fonds envoyés à Antipatros au moment de l'affaire d'Harpalos'. But if this was so Hieronymus would surely have known about it.

<sup>7</sup> The Greek word *εὐημερία* 'periods of fair weather' bears the implication that the weather will not always be fair.

<sup>8</sup> *κατασκευάζειν* here should be given its proper meaning (*LSJ* s.v. 'παρασκευάζειν') to prepare something which one has, so in connection with ships 'to fit out and prepare for service those already in the dockyards'. *ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις* accordingly refers to the ships already at sea. Goukowski translates *κατεσκεύασαν*

'construisirent' (below p. 90).

<sup>9</sup> T. Walek *RPh.* xlviii (1924) 23–30 (henceforward Walek) 'armer, mettre en ligne'; M. Cary *The History of the Greek world from 323–146 BC*<sup>2</sup> (London 1951) (henceforward Cary) 6, 'on sea the Greeks mobilised a fleet of 240 vessels'; Russell M. Geer *Diodorus Siculus* Loeb ed. ix (London 1962), 'prepare'; N. G. Ashton, 'The *naumachia* near Amorgos in 322 BC', *BSA* lxxii (1977) (henceforward Ashton) 'commission'; Goukowski *ad loc.* 'armer'.

<sup>10</sup> *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1629 808–12.

<sup>11</sup> Cary (Appendix 2, 381) nevertheless accepts the position.

surprising if the decision was for *launching* 200 triereis and 40 tetrereis, since the inventories show that at the end of 325/4 she had 360 triereis and 50 tetrereis, and at the end of 323/2 315 triereis and 50 tetrereis, 49 of these at sea.<sup>12</sup> Ashton argues<sup>13</sup> that 170 is not the overall total for the ships at sea but 'a campaign total for a specific theatre of the naval war'. This view is hardly to be reconciled with Diodorus ((v) above) who gives what is plainly a global statement of the naval position: 'In the face of Macedonian naval superiority [the Athenians] fitted out other ships in addition to those they already had [at sea] with the result that the total was 170. Cleitus was in command of the Macedonian fleet which was 240 in number.' This statement can hardly mean anything else than that all the ships which Athens could eventually muster numbered 170, and that this fleet had to face Cleitus' 240 ships. If Athens had had any other naval forces at sea, she would surely have employed them to reinforce Euetion's outnumbered fleet.

The decree then, it seems, must embody a comparatively long-term programme of expanding the number of ships that could be sent to sea by a newly organised Hellenic League, for which diplomatic moves were set on foot. The Athenian demos seems to have been persuaded that the death of Alexander offered an opportunity for Athens to rebuild and exercise a thalassocracy in the eastern Mediterranean such as Themistocles had secured with his 200 triereis long ago. Knowledge of the defeats of 322 prompts the question, what the point was of proposing measures at that moment which looked beyond the immediate threats by land and sea. The land threat was in fact contained when Antipater was besieged in Lamia and Leonnatus defeated; and the prospects by sea may have appeared good enough. The Macedonians had 110 triereis with Antipater and 130 (probably for the most part heavier) ships in Asia to set against Athens' navy, which after some casualties numbered 315 triereis and 50 tetrereis at the end of the archon year, and at the beginning may have had 392 ships or more (see below pp. 91–2 and note 36). The number of these which were first line ships and could be launched, manned and fitted out may not have been realised in the heat of the moment, but the naval position could well have given ground for belief that Athens could hold her own at sea in the immediate future while she built up the number of her active naval units with the help of her allies.

If, as Diodorus makes clear, Athens contemplated challenging the Macedonian fleet for command of the Aegean but was not, as events showed, in a position to send to sea a battle fleet of more than 170 ships including at least 50 tetrereis, it is not surprising that she should plan to provide and prepare with the help of her allies a substantial fleet in the coming years. In that case the word *παρασκευάσαι* in Diodorus can be given what Liddell-Scott-Jones regards as its 'proper meaning' i.e. 'to provide and prepare *what one has not*'. The active verb in naval contexts has this 'proper meaning' which in fact covers two more specific activities: acquiring ships by building or contribution from allies and fitting them out for sea. For the latter activity *κατασκευάζειν* is frequently used (e.g. (v) above) and LSJ gives it the proper meaning of 'fit out and prepare *what one has*'.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1629, 1631. The inventory for 323/2 made up at the end of the archon year in July shows that there were some two hundred more triereis in the dockyard after the dispatch of the fleet. Many of these would have been cavalry- and troop-transports, others old and slow, all unsuitable for inclusion in a battle fleet seeking action. There may also have been those for which gear and skilled oarsmen were not forthcoming, or the money to pay them. It is an indication of the value placed on the heavier ships at this time that all but one of the fifty tetrereis available were at sea at the end of the year.

<sup>13</sup> Ashton 7, cf. Walek 29.

<sup>14</sup> Thucydides uses the word *παρασκευάζειν* in the active voice on two occasions (ii 80.1 and iii 16.3, cf. Xen. *HG* i 4.11) to describe the activity which Diodorus describes here, i.e. the assembly of ships from the various

cities of a league and their preparation for sea. In Demosthenes' speech *On the trierarchic crown* (li) the treasurer is said to have been instructed to give the crown to the trierarch τῷ πρώτῳ παρασκευάσαντι τὴν τριήρη, and this activity is shown to consist of launching the ship (i.e. drawing the ship allocated to him from the dockyard), fitting it out, manning it and giving it a sea-trial. It is not preparing the ship for sea only but drawing it as well. The use of the word in Demosthenes *Against Evergus* (xlvii) 23 may be compared, where the speaker says that in all his many trierarchies he has never yet drawn items of gear from the public store ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ παρεσκεύαζον ('but I myself acquired them at my own expense'). In Diod. xiv 39.4 Conon is said to have sailed to Cilicia with forty of the hundred ships Pharnabazus had instructed the Cypriot kings to send him, since the whole fleet was not yet *παρασκευασμέ-*

For the composition of the fleet which Athens was proposing to acquire the choice lies between two alternatives, either that shown by the manuscript tradition, i.e. 40 triereis and 200 tetrereis, or that given by Wesseling's transposition, i.e. 40 tetrereis and 200 triereis. Which, in the circumstances of the time, is the more likely?

It is unfortunate that Diodorus does not specify the types of ship in Cleitus' fleet, but it is likely that his ships apart from the fast triereis were largely of the heavier sort. Alexander had acquired some of these larger ships from Cyprus and Phoenicia; and his *hypomnemata* recorded in Diodorus (xviii 4.4)<sup>15</sup> included a plan 'to build 1000 warships bigger than triereis' in Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for service in the western Mediterranean against, among others, the Carthaginians. The fleet of 240 ships which Antigonos was able to assemble in 315 was composed of 113 ships larger than triereis, of which 90 were tetrereis.<sup>16</sup> At the battle of Salamis in Cyprus in 307 Ptolemy's 140 warships were all either pentereis or tetrereis, while Demetrius' left wing, where he himself fought, was composed of seven heptereis, thirty Athenian tetrereis, ten hexereis and ten pentereis.<sup>17</sup> After Antigonos' death the Ptolemies' and Demetrius' passion for building ever larger oared warships became an obsession.

At Athens the trend towards tetrereis is marked in the seven years before 323; and it is accompanied by a reduction in the number of triereis. Tetrereis appear for the first time in the naval inventory of 330/29 (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1627.266–78) where eighteen of them and 399 triereis are listed. In the inventory of 326/5 (1628.482–91) there are 360 triereis while the number of tetrereis is erased (probably 40–50).<sup>18</sup> In the inventory of the following year the number of triereis is unchanged and the number of tetrereis 50 (1628.481). In the inventory of 323/2 (1631.167–74) there are 315 triereis and the entry for tetrereis is [ . . . ]ΓΙΙΙΙ at sea with one in the dockyard. Ashton<sup>19</sup> very reasonably restores as [ΔΔΔΔ] ΓΙΙΙΙ making 49, fifty all told. The entries for 323/2

νος. The word might be taken to mean just 'prepared' but in view of the passages cited and of the circumstances it is likely that it means 'assembled' i.e. delivered by the kings and fitted out. In general contexts the word παρασκευάζειν (active) means to acquire as well as to make ready what has been acquired: e.g. xi 48.3 σύστημα ξένων παρασκευάζειν, xii 46.2 μηχανάς τε γὰρ παντοδαπὰς παρεσκεύασε πολιορκητικὰς cf. also xiii 75.2, xvi 31.7, xix 51.2. The active verb is also used often in Diodorus of the acquisition of abstract things: health i 82.2, safety ii 19.9, pleasure xiii 82.5, peace xix 65.4.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Arr. *Anab.* vii 1.1–4, Curt. x 1.17–18. The plan has often been dismissed as a work of later imagination. Hornblower (n. 1) 69, for example, regards it as 'incredible, unbelievable, fantastic' and thinks that the 'plan section' in Diodorus comes from the Alexandrian vulgate, not Hieronymus but Cleitarchus. P. A. Brunt (Arrian Loeb edition ii [London 1965] Appendix xxiii 5), however, most recently, is cautiously un sceptical. It may be remembered in this connection that Diodorus, again probably relying on Cleitarchus, speaks of Hephaestion's tomb in the foundation close of which 'were set golden bows of pentereis close together, two hundred and forty in all' (xvii 115.1–2: see Morrison and Williams *Greek oared ships* [Cambridge 1968] 285, henceforward *GOS*). This account again is incredible and fantastic, but probably true.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. xix 62.7–8.

<sup>17</sup> Ptolemy, Diod. xx 49.2; Demetrius, *ib.* xx 50.3.

<sup>18</sup> In the years 326/5, 325/4, 323/2 the part of the inventory relating to ship-sheds is preserved (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1628 552–9, 1629 1020–6, 1631 252–6) 372 in all, 82 in Munychia, 198 in Zea and 94 in Cantharos. But this number does not indicate the number of ships held,

which was regularly from 400 to 410 in these years. It is unlikely that between 330/29 with 417 ships and 325/4 with 410 there would have been an unexplained reduction to 372 in 326/5. The overall number of ships held in 326/5 is likely then to have been in the neighbourhood of 400 and the number of tetrereis accordingly 40–50.

<sup>19</sup> p. 5. An alternative to Ashton's supplement is proposed by J.-M. Schmitt (Les premières tétères à Athènes, *REG* lxxxvii [1974] 80 n. i) [ΓΔΔΔΔ]ΓΙΙΙΙ i.e. 89, which brings the total holding of tetrereis to 90, and the overall total of ships to 406 (315 triereis and 90 tetrereis). Since the overall total in 330–329 is 410 (392 tr. + 18 tetr.), in 326/5 ?400 (360 tr. + 40? tetr.), and in 325/4 410 (360 tr. + 50 tetr.), Schmitt draws the reasonable conclusion that there was a policy in these years to keep the overall total of ships around 400/410, and that therefore with only 315 triereis in 323/2 the number of tetrereis must be put at 90. The difficulty with this final extrapolation is that the 323/2 inventory was made at the end of a year when two of the three unsuccessful naval engagements had almost certainly been fought by Euetion, in one at least of which the Athenian fleet lost many ships, probably in both. It is possible, as Ashton (8) has argued, that the last off Amorgus took place too late for the casualties to affect the inventory, but this is not certain. The overall total in the inventory, whatever the policy may have been, is then likely to reflect substantial battle casualties and unlikely to show the normal figure. The normal figure cannot accordingly be used to deduce the number of tetrereis in the inventory. An overall total of 365 ships (315 tr. + 50) seems preferable for the position at the end of that year.

were made after losses incurred by Euetion's fleet in the actions taking place in time to be reported and recorded. These losses account for the unusually low total figure of 365 ships in that year as against 410 in 325/4, probably 410 or so in 326/5 (see note 18) and 417 in 330/29. The inventory gives the number of triereis at sea in 323/2 as [. . .] ΔΔΔ ΙΙΙΙ. For the two numerical symbols to be supplied the choice lies between ϜΔ making 94, ΗΔ making 144, ΗϜ making 184 and ΗΗ making 234. Believing that the figure in Diodorus of 170 for Euetion's fleet at the beginning of the naval campaign of 322 belongs only to a squadron at the Hellespont and that Athens had other ships at sea, Ashton opts for the supplement ΗϜ making 184, which with the 49 tetrereis brings the total of ships at sea to 233, in, he thinks, two squadrons. This conclusion, resting ultimately on the assumption that Athens actually *launched* 240 ships at the beginning of the war, cannot be reconciled with (v). The inventory may however be brought into harmony with (v) if the smallest of the four possible supplements is adopted, viz. ϜΔ making a total of 94, and thus an overall total of 143 for all ships at sea at the end of the archon year.<sup>20</sup> This figure would then give 27 (170 less 143) for the number of ships lost by Euetion after the fleet had been brought up, either by additions or replacements (see note 36 below), to the strength of 170 ships. Ashton has pointed out that although the battle of Amorgus took place in the archon year 323/2 on the testimony of the *Marmor Parium*, it may have been fought so late that the losses incurred in it could not be recorded in the inventory of that year. They may not have been very great (see below p. 93f.).

If the earlier losses are divided roughly (and of course arbitrarily) between triereis and tetrereis, seventeen triereis and ten tetrereis may be regarded as having been lost, and the 170 ships of Euetion's reinforced fleet be regarded as having been composed of 111 triereis and 59 tetrereis.

The following table summarises the numerical aspects of the argument, with hypothetical figures in brackets:

Archon Year	Inscriptions IG ii <sup>2</sup>	Triereis			Tetrereis			Pent- ereis	Total Units
		Dockyard	Sea	Total	Dockyard	Sea	Total		
330/29	1627.266-78	385	7	392	8	10	18	—	410
326/5	1628.482-91	325	32+3*	360	(40+)	5+	(50)	—	410
325/4	1629.783-812	325	32+3*	360	43	7	50	7	417
323/2	1631.167-174	(221)	(94)	315 } (332)	1	49 } (60)	(10)		(392)
		Casualties after reinforcement			(17)				

\* Hippegoi voted ἀχρηστοί κατά πόλεμον

Insight into the composition of Macedonian fleets is only occasional in the last quarter of the century but the glimpse nearest to 323, Antigonus' fleet in 315, shows a large force of tetrereis. Athens' fleets can be examined closely in the seven years before 323 and show a rapid increase in the use of tetrereis. The fact that her battle fleet of 322 contained all but one of her force of tetrereis but only a little more than a third of her triereis shows the value which was now placed on the larger vessels. Owing to a change in tactical concepts it appears that the fast, light, trieres was becoming obsolete as a first-line ship, although triereis continued to be used in large numbers. The conclusion reached is that Wesseling's transposition is unnecessary. The Athenian assembly, pursuing the aim of naval superiority in the Aegean, is more likely to have planned to provide and prepare a large force of tetrereis supported by forty triereis than a large force of triereis and forty tetrereis, fewer tetrereis in fact than the 50-60 she was probably in a position to deploy in 322, and possessed in 325/4.

<sup>20</sup> There are seven pentereis in the dockyard in 325/4 at sea or in the dockyard in 323/2. (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1629 808) but there is no mention of them either

The problem of accommodating a large number of new ships in the dockyards is not a serious one. Since new building was continuous, there must have been a regular procedure for scrapping the older ships, and those that were not rated 'fast', *stratiotides* and *hippagogoi*, could have been stood in the open air (ὑπαίθριοι in IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1611.6 of 357/6). In fact the number of ship-sheds recorded was regularly less than the number of triereis.<sup>21</sup> Although gear for tetrereis was routinely so designated in the inventories, there is nothing to indicate that tetrereis needed special sheds. If, as is likely, they were pulled by double-manned oars at two levels, any increase in beam for a trieres would have been compensated by the absence of the trieres' outrigger (See Fig. 1). It is most unlikely that the tetreres would have been longer than the trieres, which, with its files of  $\pm 30$  oarsmen, seems to have reached the limit of length that was technically feasible.




FIG. 1. Graffito from Alba Fucentia showing a warship labelled *navis tetreris longa* ('four' long ship), first century BC—first century AD.

### III. THE NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS OF 322 BC

(vi) *The Marmor Parium*; FGrH 239 B 9.

The final decisive action of the naval campaign of 322 is generally recognised to have taken place near Amorgus in the Sporades (but see note 23 below). It is recorded on the *Marmor Parium* as the sole naval battle of the archon year 323/2:

ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ γενομένου περὶ Λαμίαν Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς γενομένης Μακεδόσιν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους περὶ Ἀμοργόν, ἦν ἐνίκων Μακεδόνες, ἔτη πεντήκοντα ἑννέα, ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησιν Κηφισοδώρου.

From the war which broke out between the Athenians and Antipater for Lamia and from the sea-battle which took place between the Macedonians and the Athenians near Amorgus and in which the Macedonians were victorious, 59 years, when Cephisodotus was archon at Athens.

This was clearly the best known, because for the Athenians it was the most decisive battle of the campaign. Plutarch refers to it twice, mentioning Cleitus on one occasion as the Macedonian commander. His evidence, however, gives some, perhaps slight, indication that the defeat was not a rout and that the Athenian losses were not heavy. At *Demetr.* 11.3 he mentions that the

<sup>21</sup> See D. J. Blackman in GOS 181: 'The number of ship-sheds was probably always somewhat less than the number of ships in the fleet: the balance will often have been at sea, but we do hear of ships standing in the open air.'

wrecks from the battle were towed back to Piraeus. A heavily defeated fleet usually had to surrender its wrecks to the enemy, for whom they were a mark of victory.<sup>22</sup> At *Mor.* 338a he speaks of Cleitus being hailed as the god Poseidon 'after oversetting three or four Greek triereis at Amorgus'. The battle was nevertheless decisive, and it could hardly have been other than the last.<sup>23</sup>

(vii) *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 398 and 493.19–21

Ashton and Goukowski<sup>24</sup> give the evidence, which seems conclusive, for believing that the other of the two naval battles of the campaign took place at the Hellespont near Abydus:

(1). *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 398 (320/19: a fragment of an Athenian decree): καὶ μάχη]ς τῆς ἐν Ἑλλη[σπόντῳ γενομένης πολλοὺς δι[έ]σ[ωσε καὶ λυτρωσάμενο]ς ἀπέστειλε[ν καὶ αἴτιος ἐγένετο τ]οῦ σωθῆναι.

And when the battle in the Hellespont took place he rescued many, and after paying their ransoms sent them home, being responsible for their release.

(2) *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 493.19–21 (303/2: an Athenian decree in honour of Nicon of Abydus): καὶ ἐπὶ πολέμου τοῦ προτέρου τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν συνδιέσωσεν καὶ ἐφόδια δούς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

And in the foregoing war he helped to rescue many (Athenian) citizens, gave them money for their journey and sent them back to Athens.

An obvious strategical objective for Euetion's fleet was the prevention of Macedonian armies from crossing the Straits into Europe and coming to Antipater's relief. To this end command of the Hellespont was necessary. Since first Leonnatus and then Craterus<sup>25</sup> made the crossing, it appears from these facts and the inscriptional evidence that Euetion and Cleitus disputed command of the Straits in a formal naval battle, and that Euetion was defeated.

Another obvious strategic objective for Euetion was the fleet of the fast triereis which Alexander had sent as an escort for a cargo of bullion from Asia to Macedonia, and which Antipater subsequently took with him on his march south on news of the Greek revolt ((iv) above). Lamia stands at the head of the Malian Gulf. When therefore Antipater was besieged there, his fleet is likely to have remained in the area.

The two *naumachiai*, i.e. battles in which the fleets confronted each other in line of battle, mentioned by Diodorus are likely to be those at the Hellespont and Amorgus. The first is so called in the *Marmor Parium*, and the second in *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 493 (probably).

It has been debated whether, when Diodorus, after mentioning these two *naumachiai*, goes on to say 'and he (Cleitus) destroyed many of the enemy ships in the neighbourhood of the Echinades islands', he is speaking of a third engagement, not a formal *naumachia*, or is adding a comment on one of those he has mentioned. The difficulty is that the only known Echinades islands are off the coast of Acarnania where neither of the two *naumachiai* could possibly have taken place. The suggestion that Ἐχινάδας is a scribal error for Σποράδας, and that the

<sup>22</sup> See J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates *The Athenian trireme* (Cambridge 1986) 86, 126, 166.

<sup>23</sup> Goukowski 128 in a note on (v) above seems to take it as a list of three engagements in chronological order, i.e. he regards the skirmish 'near the Echinades' as taking place *after* the two pitched battles. He says: 'Diodore fait allusion à trois batailles navales livrées par Cleitos à Euetion, dont deux sont antérieures à la décision de construire les nouveaux navires qui combattirent au cours de la troisième'. He identifies the first battles as taking place at Abydus and Amorgus.

In the first place, since the three engagements undoubtedly took place in the same campaigning season it is impossible to suppose that ships laid down after the first two battles were ready in time for the third

engagement. It is equally impossible, as a matter of interpretation, to take the statement in (vi) referring to the balance of sea-power as alluding to a state of affairs after the two battles and before the skirmish, all three of which it subsequently proceeds to mention. And thirdly, Amorgus owes its importance to the fact that it was the final decisive battle. It is hardly conceivable that an Athenian fleet would have been sent to the Malian gulf to meet Cleitus immediately afterwards.


<sup>24</sup> Ashton 7, Goukowski 126.

<sup>25</sup> Cary (Appendix ii 381) argues that Leonnatus had crossed earlier and that Euetion was attempting to prevent Craterus crossing when he was challenged by Cleitus.

reference is accordingly to Amorgus, is not philologically attractive. Against it is also the admittedly slight evidence that Euetion did not lose many ships at Amorgus. More cogent is the introduction of the last sentence with καὶ which favours a third engagement. Walek and Goukowski accept this interpretation, Ashton regards it as a possibility claiming, like Cary, that the text is ambiguous.<sup>26</sup> Walek and Goukowski adopt the suggestion that Ἐχινάδας is an error for Λιχάδας, a group of three islands mentioned by Strabo and bearing the same name today, situated between C. Cenaeum at the north-western tip of Euboea and the mainland coast to the south (see map).<sup>27</sup> The reason for the mistake is unlikely to be scribal, but north and west of the Lichades islands on the northern coast of the gulf there is a cape named in modern times Ekino and west of it a city Echinus (mod. Ekino) mentioned three times by Strabo.<sup>28</sup> It is possible that the islands also bore the name Echinades because of association with, or proximity to, Echinus. Most likely, perhaps, is a confusion in Diodorus or his source between the name of the city and the name of the islands, which, if the mainland and Euboea were, as is likely, now hostile to the Macedonians, would provide a base for the Macedonian ships (*cf.* the Sybota islands in similar circumstances for the Corcyraean fleet: Thuc. i 35–54). Walek saw the capture of Styra by the Athenian general Phaedrus at this time and the adherence of Carystus to the new league, both places in Euboea (but a long way from the Malian gulf) as evidence of Athenian activity in this area.<sup>29</sup> The most cogent argument for an engagement between Euetion's and Cleitus' fleets at the head of the Malian gulf is the certain presence there of Antipater's squadron of 110 fast triereis, fair game for Euetion's more numerous ships at first launching. But the fact that in Diodorus's text it is Cleitus who 'destroyed many of the Athenian ships near the Echinades islands' indicates that Euetion did not get there in time to prevent Cleitus' main fleet joining the squadron of triereis.<sup>30</sup> It would seem then that Euetion declined a formal battle in the gulf but could not escape without losses. This then is likely to have been the first contest between the two fleets, followed by a pitched battle at the Hellespont, and a final pitched battle off Amorgus.

(viii) *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 505 (302/1)

A third inscription of great interest relates to the campaign as a whole. It is an Athenian decree of 302/1 in honour of two Athenian metics, Nicandrus and Polyzelus, who had been enthusiastic supporters of



<sup>26</sup> Walek 28, Ashton 8 n. 55, Goukowski 128. Cary (Appendix ii 382) prefers the alternative of two battles only.

<sup>27</sup> Strabo ix 4.4.

<sup>28</sup> Strabo ix 5.10, 5.13, and 5.22.

<sup>29</sup> 29, *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 682 and Strabo x 1.6; Diod. xviii 11.2.

<sup>30</sup> Cary (Appendix ii 382) argues convincingly that Cleitus' 240 ships must have included the squadron of 110 triereis.



Athenian naval activities in the years before 323/2. After the usual preliminaries it proceeds as follows, becoming defective and breaking off in a most tantalising manner:

[ἐ]πιειδὴ Νίκανδρος Ἀντιφάνους Ἰλίου καὶ Πολύζ[η]λος Ἀπολλοφάνους Ἐφέσιος διατετελέκασιν ἐν [π]αντὶ τῷ καιρῷ εὖνους ὄντες τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων καὶ κατοικοῦντες Ἀθήνησιν εἰς πολλὰ τῶν σ[υ]μφερόντων τῷ δήμῳ χρήσιμοι γεγόνασιν, εἰς τ[ε] τὴν οἰκοδομίαν τῶν νεωσοίκων καὶ τῆς σκευοθή[κ]ης εἰσφέροντες τὰς εἰσφοράς καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐ[ν]ιαυτὸν τὰς εἰς τὰ δέκα τάλαντα καλῶς καὶ προθύ[μ]ως ἀπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρχοντος μέχρι Κηφισοδ[ώ]ρου, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πολέμου εἰς τὰς ναῦς [τὰς] μετ' Εὐε[τί]ωνος ἐκπλευσάσας εἰς τε τὴν πρώτην . . . ] ασιν καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως συνεπεμελήθησ[αν ὅπως] ἂν ἐκπλεύσωσιν, καὶ πάλιν [ἀ]πὸ τῆς ναυμαχ[ί]ας καταπλευσασῶν τῶν νεῶν τῆς . . . Ἄ . . . τῆς ἕξαι .- 8/- παραγγελίασιν - -

Since Nicandrus son of Antiphanes of Ilium and Polyzelus son of Apollophanes of Ephesus have consistently supported the demos at every turn; and, being resident in Athens, have given assistance in many projects beneficial to the demos both in the building of the ship-sheds and the gear-store,<sup>31</sup> paying their contributions each year to the ten talents<sup>32</sup> with admirable enthusiasm from the archonship of Themistocles to the archonship of Cephisodorus (347/6–323/2); and (in particular) at the time of the Greek war, in respect of the fleet sailing out with Euetion, with admirable public spirit shared the responsibility for seeing that it sailed out to its first . . . and when the expedition returned to port after the sea-battle. . . .

The decree, like (vii) (2), dates from the years at the end of the fourth century when Athens felt free to honour those who had assisted her in her naval efforts before the battle of Amorgus. It testifies to the naval policy of those years as shown by the building of the ship-sheds and the gear-store. It recalls the two metics' good service to Athens in a naval programme which culminated in their activity in the 'Greek war' i.e. the war conducted by the new Hellenic league against Macedon, and in the dispatch of Euetion's fleet and on its return to port after the 'sea-battle'. Two phrases are of importance to the present argument: (1) ἐκπλευσάσας εἰς τὴν πρώτην[. . .] ασιν and (2) καὶ πάλιν [ἀ]πὸ τῆς ναυμαχ[ί]ας καταπλευσασῶν τῶν νεῶν. . .

Dittenberger's supplement πρώτην ἐξέτ[α]σι in (1) is unsatisfactory. The word ἐξέτασις is used of a military review (see LSJ s.v.), but the word for the sea-trials which a ship had to undergo after fitting-out when first commissioned is ἀνάπειρα (e.g. Demosthenes li 5); and if sea-trials are meant the sense of πρώτην is obscure. It seems unlikely that ἐξέτασις could be used here tropically for the test of battle, nor is there any parallel for a review of all the ships of a departing fleet together. Further, ἐκπλους, ἐκπλεῖν, are the words for the actual departure of a fleet from port as κατάπλους, καταπλεῖν are for its return.<sup>33</sup> A more likely supplement would seem to be [ν σύστ], the phrase 'sailing out of port for their first encounter (with the enemy)' then balancing 'the ships returning to port after the sea-battle'. σύστασις is used of military encounters by Herodotus and Plato and by Plutarch for naval encounter in the battle of Salamis in Cyprus.<sup>34</sup>

The *naumachia* after which the fleet returned to port must be Amorgus. For the purpose of the decree, twenty years after the campaign, Amorgus had become the sea-battle *par excellence* as it had for the *Marmor Parium*. The phrase 'first encounter' is well chosen if it refers to the skirmish in the Malian gulf, which was Euetion's first contact with the enemy but which was not a formal *naumachia* as the two subsequent encounters were. The arguments for three engagements and for the supplement σύστ[α]σις are independent of each other; but fit neatly together, making (viii) contain an informative reference to the whole campaign of 322.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. IG ii<sup>2</sup> 457. 65–6.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. IG ii<sup>2</sup> 43.68.

<sup>33</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup> 72 (433/2) 5 and 19 στρατηγοὶ ἐκπλέοντες (with a fleet to Cyprus), 622B (200–170 BC) ἐκπλεύσαντι ἐπὶ στρατείαν Κύπρον. For the regular use of

ἐκπλεῖν and καταπλεῖν for leaving and returning to port see SIG<sup>4</sup> Index s.v. ἐκπλεῖν.

<sup>34</sup> Hdt. vi 117, vii 167; Plato *Laws* 833a; Plut. *Demetr.* 16.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

The decision of the Athenian assembly, as recorded in Diodorus' text, to assemble forty triereis and two hundred tetrereis, as a battle fleet to win command of the Aegean for the Greeks, fits well both the fashion of the time in naval construction and the mood of heady jingoism which the decree as a whole breathes. Diodorus' source, Hieronymus, describes the latter with some cynicism. Yet if Athens was to match the hour and achieve naval supremacy, the planning had to be done at once. Steps had to be taken before she had, as it were, passed the qualifying test which naval encounters in the coming spring and summer were to bring. Walek<sup>35</sup> saw a real change in the balance of power at sea between 323 and 322, which needed explanation. The argument in this paper is that there was no real change, only a sharp contrast between the dream of 323 and the unhappy realities of 322. In the event Athens failed the qualifying round.

In spite of the support evoked by the 'clever speaking' of the Athenian diplomatic offensive, when it came to the crunch in the following spring the Macedonians, with 240 ships, still held naval superiority, and Athens was able to muster a smaller fleet which by reinforcement, or by replacement after an early engagement, she was able to bring up to the number of 170 ships but no more. The total of the naval units sent to sea in the spring and summer is likely to have comprised 111 triereis and 59 tetrereis.<sup>36</sup> It is probably Hieronymus who in Diodorus dismisses the performance of Euetion's fleet in a short catalogue of defeats. But, nevertheless, a strategy may be detected which even in the circumstances had an outside chance of success, the sort of success which a Themistocles or a Phormio might have won in earlier times against the odds. With roughly two ships to the enemy's three the one thing Euetion could not afford to do was to divide his forces. On the other hand the chance division of the Macedonian fleet into two squadrons, 110 fast triereis and 130 mostly heavier ships, was probably still a strategic factor at the outset of the campaign.

In that case, as soon as Euetion's ships were launched, his first target would naturally have been the detached, and weaker, enemy squadron close at hand in the Malian gulf. With that defeated he could then have turned on an outnumbered Cleitus, and had a chance of gaining control of the Hellespont and preventing reinforcements reaching Antipater from Asia. But Cleitus seems to have seen the danger and moved west to join the 110 triereis in the Malian gulf before they could be attacked by Euetion, inflicting losses on the Athenian fleet but not bringing it to battle. Both fleets must then have moved to the Hellespont. Euetion gave battle there but was defeated, and Antipater's reinforcements got through. Euetion may now have retired to the Sporades hoping for further ships from Piraeus, or he may have been caught off Amorgus on his way home. He fought and was defeated again by Cleitus in the final and decisive engagement of the campaign, a battle which marks the end of Athens as a sea-power in antiquity.

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<sup>35</sup> 24, followed by Goukowski 128.

<sup>36</sup> Cary suggested (Appendix ii) that the reinforcement bringing the number of Euetion's fleet up to 170 (v) may have been replacements for losses suffered, in his view, in the first of the two *naumachiai*, i.e. in the Hellespont. If losses were incurred by Euetion in the Malian gulf before the two *naumachiai*, as is argued here, the reinforcements could equally well have been replacements for these. This latter hypothesis would mean that the total forces sent to sea by Athens in 322 would have exceeded 170 by about the number of ships

lost in the Malian gulf; and the total losses up to the time when the number of ships at sea was recorded in the inventory as 143 would have exceeded 27 by the same number. The attraction of this hypothesis is that it makes it more likely that Euetion would have risked battle at the Hellespont if his fleet had been brought up to strength (i.e. 170) after the losses in the gulf than if it had not. Athenian fleets readily took on superior numbers in the Peloponnesian war and were often successful, but times, and tactics, had changed.